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Dan Smoot Report

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

DAN SMOOT

DISARMAMENT STORY — PART I

In December, 1945, the foreign minister of Great Britain and the U. S. Secretary of State met with the Soviet foreign minister in Moscow to discuss disarmament. They agreed to sponsor, at the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, a resolution to create an international Atomic Energy Commission.[1]

On January 24, 1946, the General Assembly, meeting at London, adopted the resolution, empowering an Atomic Energy Commission to make proposals concerning the elimination, or control, of atomic weapons—and to make recommendations concerning international exchange of scientific information. Bernard M. Baruch was the first United States Representative on the international Atomic Energy Commission.[1,2]

On March 28, 1946, Dean G. Acheson and David Lilienthal submitted a report, outlining United States proposals for the international control and sharing of atomic energy knowledge and materials. Baruch was given some leeway to revise the proposals before formally submitting them, on behalf of the United States government, to the United Nations.[3]

On June 14, 1946, Baruch submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission the United States Proposals—which came to be known as the "Baruch Plan" and the "Baruch-Lilienthal Plan."[2,3]

The Baruch plan proposed the creation of a new International Atomic Development Authority, which, operating under the broad control of the UN General Assembly, would have absolute "control, or ownership, of all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous to world security"; and would have the "power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities." The new Authority could seize and dispose of all existing atomic bombs, prohibit further manufacture of bombs, and prescribe "serious" penalties against any nation for violating regulations issued by the Authority. The plan also suggested total disarmament (elimination not only of atomic weapons, but of all conventional weapons and military forces)—to be achieved in stages.[2,3]

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On July 19, 1946, Andrei A. Gromyko presented the proposal of the Soviet Union. The Soviet plan ignored the Baruch proposal for total disarmament; but, insofar as it concerned *atomic* disarmament, the Soviet plan was virtually indentical with the Baruch plan. There was, however, one essential difference in approach. Whereas the Baruch plan called for a new International Atomic Energy Authority to operate under the control of the UN General Assembly, the Soviets wanted the old Atomic Energy Commission to handle atomic energy affairs, *under control of the UN Security Council.*[4]

The Soviets were shortsighted. They wanted a UN agency which could strip the United States of its atomic weapons, since they were years behind us at that time and knew that the agency would not limit their own plans for research and development. They did not foresee, however, the day (now arrived) when they and their friends could control the UN General Assembly. They wanted control of the atomic energy centered in the UN Security Council where they had a veto, fearing that the UN General Assembly might make a decision they did not like.

It seems more than likely that the United States would have modified the Baruch plan enough to meet all objections offered by the Soviets. This was never done, however, largely because Congress (despite the large and powerful peace claque of liberals which it contained) reflected the deeper instincts of the nation: namely, that the Baruch plan, modified or not, was a blueprint for the surrender of our national independence.

As time marched on, the Soviets became less interested in the Baruch plan, because they had begun to catch up with us in atomic research and development—thanks to our voluntary de-emphasis of activity in this field; to the atom spies who delivered our major secrets to the Soviets; and to German scientists whom we had permitted the Soviets to kidnap and take to Russia.

On January 11, 1952, the UN General Assembly, at the urging of the United States, created a Disarmament Commission to study and supervise the problem of general disarmament; but the propaganda for "international control" of atomic energy subtly changed. There was less emphasis on controlling atomic energy, more emphasis on international sharing of atomic energy knowledge and materials.[2,4]

By the middle of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's first year in office (1953), "diversion of nuclear materials from military use to peaceful purposes" had become the cardinal theme of nuclear disarmament propaganda. Communists emphasized this theme, because, in communist dialectics, it meant giving United States' nuclear materials away so that the United States could not use them for military purposes, while the Soviets could concentrate on military use for their nuclear materials.

In December, 1953, President Eisenhower (with his "atoms for peace" plan) gave a great boost to this "diversion of nuclear materials" scheme.

In an "atoms for peace" speech to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower recommended that the UN create an International Atomic Energy Agency, to which all governments producing atomic energy could make contributions of normal uranium and fissionable materials. The UN agency would store the materials and allocate them around the world (to nations not producing such materials) for peaceful uses.[2]

Almost three years later—on October 23, 1956—the General Assembly of the UN approved a charter for the atomic energy agency which Eisenhower had recommended. Three days later—October 26, 1956, before any nation had had opportunity to ratify the charter—President Eisenhower pledged the United States to give the new agency, immediately, 5,000 kilograms (11,000 pounds) of Uranium 235; and, after that, to match combined contributions of all other nations on earth.

The late U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy fought hard against Senate ratification of the IAEA charter, predicting that communists would take over the new agency and use it against us.

The Senate Atomic Energy committee held

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hearings—receiving repeated assurances from the State Department and from the Atomic Energy Commission that there was no possibility of communists taking over the IAEA.

Internationalist supporters of the IAEA were scornful of McCarthyites for suggesting that the President, the State Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission would recommend anything dangerous for America.

The Senate ratified the IAEA charter on June 18, 1957, and the agency came into being on July 29, 1957, when 18 nations had ratified the charter. By the end of October, 1957, communist-bloc nations had gained control of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the U. S. State Department was professing to be "indignant" and "perturbed."[5]

Almost simultaneously with the capture of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Soviets (October, 1957), launched the first man-made earth satellite, thus dazzling the world with their achievements in nuclear, and related, research. The noise of peace-at-any-price propaganda was intensified.

On March 31, 1958, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister, announced that the Soviet Union was halting all testing of nuclear weapons; and he called upon other nations, possessing such weapons, also to stop testing, in the interest of "peace and security for all peoples." Why? The Soviets had just finished a series of tests; it would take them a year or more to correlate and evaluate all information thus produced; and in the interim they could not profitably do any more testing.[1,2] Gromyko's announcement, in other words, was a trick designed either to stop United States nuclear testing or to give the Soviets some propaganda fodder against us if we did not stop.

Officials of the Eisenhower State Department correctly called the Soviet plea a fraud, but challenged the Soviets to approach the subject in "an orderly way," through negotiations to work out a supervised suspension of nuclear testing.[2]

On October 31, 1958, representatives from the United States and the Soviet Union met at Geneva for the first U.S.-U.S.S.R. "test ban talks," and agreed to suspend all testing of nuclear weapons (without inspections to determine that the agreement was being kept) while the talks continued. Eisenhower stopped United States testing, accepting Khrushchev's unsupported promise to stop Soviet testing.

Week after week, month after month, the "test ban talks" continued, fruitlessly. The Soviets, busy assimilating information already produced by tests, did not need to make nuclear shots in the atmosphere; but—as the whole world was aware—they went right ahead with underground shots and any other testing they pleased, ignoring their agreement to halt all tests for the duration of the negotiations. Eisenhower kept the agreement, however, permitting no American testing, of any kind, during the remainder of his administration.[1,2]

Dreary communiques from Geneva about another non-productive session of the "test ban talks" often seemed timed, with sardonic humor, to coincide with other events which underscored the absurdity of the talks. For example, on August 3, 1959, a report from Geneva revealed that the 118th test-ban meeting was deadlocked because of bitter disagreement. On that same day, the White House announced that Eisenhower had agreed to a personal exchange of visits with Khrushchev.[6]

On September 18, 1959, Khrushchev—in the United States as an honored guest of our President—spoke to the UN General Assembly, recommending total worldwide disarmament, without inspection and controls. This was intended not only as a direct insult to the United States but as a propaganda coup which would embarrass us in the eyes of the world. The theme of Khrushchev's speech was that the peace-loving Soviets were willing to disarm but the war-mongering, imperialistic United States would not agree. In fact, the United States was the first to propose total worldwide disarmament, but had been insisting on international inspection and controls to

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guarantee that no nation violated disarmament agreements.[1,2]

Khrushchev's speech—though patently a dishonest propaganda blast—had an ominous effect on American government leaders. On October 18, 1959, Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, revealed that the State Department had already begun to weaken its previous firm stand that agreement on controls should precede any agreement to disarm. Mr. Wilcox, in a speech at Miami, said that the problem of determining which should come first, *disarmament* or *controls*, is as baffling as the old riddle about which came first, the chicken or the egg.[7]

On March 15, 1960, five Western powers and five communist powers met at Geneva for general disarmament talks. These were in addition to the test ban talks still going on at Geneva.[2]

On September 23, 1960, the Soviets attempted another propaganda coup, by formally presenting to the United Nations the Soviet plan for world-wide disarmament (the same plan which Khrushchev had informally recommended a year before).[2]

Meanwhile, members of Congress had been warning that we were endangering the security of our nation by honoring the no-nuclear-testing agreement of October, 1958. For example, U. S. Senator Thomas J. Dodd (Connecticut Democrat) said:

"Before it is too late, we must call off the [nuclear test] ban. At stake is the preservation of peace and the survival of our nation and of freedom on this earth. Our guileless approach to the moratorium places us in mortal peril, for it rests on blind trust in the honesty of the Kremlin, a dictatorship with a shocking record of violations of its pledges."[8]

Nonetheless, when President John F. Kennedy was inaugurated in 1961, he continued the ban on American nuclear testing, though, by this time, it was certain that the Soviets had been making tests needed for the development of new weapons.

President Kennedy appointed Paul Nitze Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Walt W. Rostow Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It later became known that these two officials of the Kennedy administration (together with others from the Council on Foreign Relations) had lectured, almost a year before, to a National Strategy Seminar at Asilomar Conference Grounds on the Monterey Peninsula, in California.[9]

The general theme of lectures which Rostow and Nitze, and others, gave at the Strategy Seminar was that the United States cannot win a nuclear war; that continued attempts to produce nuclear superiority will spur the Soviets to do likewise and thus increase the danger of a holocaust; that we should, therefore, de-emphasize nuclear weapons on the theory that the Soviets will follow our lead; that we should build up our conventional military power in order to increase our capacity to fight limited wars; and that we should work toward some form of world government strong enough to eliminate wars altogether.[9]

Paul Nitze told the Strategy Seminar that the United States should begin disarmament without requiring disarmament of other nations, in the hope that our action would "produce reciprocal action on the part of our allies and also on the part of our enemies." He said we should stop trying to build a Class A nuclear capability, which could take offensive action: that we should build *purely retaliatory* defense systems, and then surrender command of those systems to international authority. He proposed that we make this surrender by giving NATO command of our Strategic Air Command, and by notifying the United Nations that NATO will turn over to the UN the ultimate power of decision on the use of American retaliatory systems.[9]

On March 23, 1961, about 75 persons representing various leftwing groups attended a State Department "briefing" session on disarmament. Mr. E. A. Gullion, Deputy Director of the Disarmament Administration (a temporary group, created by Presidential order, without congressional approval) presided. He urged the groups to propagandize for establishment of a *permanent*

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Disarmament Agency under State Department control, not answerable to Congress. An agency free of congressional controls would have more latitude for doing what it felt necessary in the field of disarmament, Mr. Gullion explained, pointing out that it is "difficult to work under the 18th century Constitution."

On March 28, 1961, President Kennedy sent to Congress a defense message modeled on a confidential memorandum submitted to him by his Deputy Assistant, Walt W. Rostow, who had had a private meeting in Moscow with Vasily V. Kuznetsov. Rostow told President Kennedy the Soviets think Americans do not really want disarmament, because the United States continues to build a "first-strike" capability against the Soviet Union. Rostow recommended that we allay Soviet suspicions by *de-emphasizing* offensive weapons and by *emphasizing* defensive weapons.

On March 30, 1961, the *Chicago Sun-Times* published a story headlined: *Inside Story Of A Big Switch: Kennedy's Defense Strategy Tailored To Ease Red Fears.* The story was written in Washington by Thomas B. Ross, who commented on the relationship between Kennedy's defense program and the Rostow memorandum saying:

"The similarities in the statements of Rostow and Mr. Kennedy were no coincidence. It is known that large sections of the President's defense message were written explicitely for the consumption of top Russian officials.

"Moreover, on the recommendation of Charles E. Bohlen, the State Department's leading expert on Russia, certain communist phraseology was inserted in the message . . . .

"That much of the defense message was directed to the Soviet leaders is evident in the fact that Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Ambassador to Russia, was given a special briefing on it . . . . The message will now be forwarded to him in Moscow so he can reassure Soviet officials that the United States is taking care not to produce a 'first-strike capability.'

"Emphasis on a 'second-strike' capability ran through all the White House meetings on the message. Most of the sessions were directed by Mr. Kennedy's chief aide, Theodore Sorensen, who repeatedly made it clear that the President wanted to avoid provocative, offensive weapons."

On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy, in a special message to Congress, asked for establishment of a disarmament agency.[2] This was the first formal step toward the agency which the March 23, 1961, State Department briefing of leftwing leaders had prepared the propaganda campaign for.

On June 23, 1961, John J. McCloy, Special Advisor to the President on Disarmament (and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations), sent to the President a proposed bill to create the new agency. In his letter of transmittal to the President, McCloy revealed that the fundamental purpose of the Disarmament Agency would be to work for world government.[2]

On June 29, 1961, President Kennedy sent McCloy's bill to Congress. In his letter of transmittal, the President also revealed that the purpose of the bill was not only to work toward elimination of national armaments, but to "strengthen international institutions" into world government.[2]

On August 15, 1961, four former high officials in the Eisenhower administration — Christian A. Herter, Thomas S. Gates, General Alfred M. Gruenther, and Henry Cabot Lodge (all members of the Council on Foreign Relations) — testified before a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee in support of President Kennedy's Disarmament Agency. Lodge urged Western powers to set up a "unified diplomatic command" so that our "decision-making machinery" would not be cumbersome.[10]

Former President Eisenhower wrote a letter strongly endorsing the proposed agency.

On August 30, 1961, the Soviet Union abruptly announced that it would resume massive testing of nuclear weapons. The moratorium which the Soviets had asked for in 1958 was at last to end: they had completed analyses of their 1958 tests and were ready for another series.[1,2]

The announced Soviet plan to resume nuclear

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testing did not slow down the American drive for disarmament. On September 23, 1961, the House of Representatives authorized a final version of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 (HR 9118, Public Law 87-297), to establish an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Just as E. A. Gullion had demanded at the State Department briefing six months before, the agency was set up free of congressional controls.

On September 25, 1961 — two days after the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 was passed in the House — Adlai Stevenson presented, to the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations, the American plan for total worldwide disarmament. This American plan (very similar to the plan which the Soviet Union had submitted to the UN on September 23, 1960) would create a permanent United Nations peace force, transfer control of U. S. nuclear weapons to the UN, restrict America's military establishment to size and kind needed for control of the American people, and prohibit the United States from possessing, or even trying to develop, a *defense* against weapons of mass destruction.[11]

On December 13, 1961, the marathon test-ban conference which American, British, and Soviet delegates had been attending at Geneva since October 31, 1958; and the general-disarmament conference which delegates from five Western nations and delegates from five communist nations had been attending at Geneva since March 15, 1960, were merged and expanded into an Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (which has been holding meetings ever since).[2]

On March 2, 1962, President Kennedy said the Soviets, in their nuclear tests, were pressing hard toward the goal of developing the most desperately needed weapon of our time — a means of destroying attacking enemy missiles before they explode on target. The President said the Soviet tests of 1961 "reflected . . . the trial of novel designs and techniques, and some substantial gains in weaponry." Mentioning the powerful "nuclear attack and defense capability" which the Soviets are developing, the President warned that further Soviet tests would gravely endanger the free world. He said that the United States "cannot make similar strides without testing in the atmosphere as well as underground," and that "in many areas of nuclear weapons research we have reached the point where our progress is stifled without experiments in every environment."[1,2]

Concerning the possibility of negotiating some effective ban on Soviet testing, the President said:

"The basic lesson of some 3 years and 353 negotiating sessions at Geneva is this — that the Soviets will not agree to an effective ban . . . as long . . . as . . . a new uninspected moratorium or a new agreement without controls, would enable them once again to prevent the West from testing while they prepare in secret."[1,2]

Formally ending our unilateral ban on nuclear testing (in effect since October 31, 1958), President Kennedy ordered a new series of atmospheric tests to be held in the Pacific beginning in late April, 1962, but promised not to conduct the tests if the Soviets would sign a nuclear test-ban treaty by mid-April.[2]

There followed a series of pleading efforts, most of them initiated by our government, to get the Soviets to agree to a nuclear test-ban treaty so that the United States could cancel the proposed tests.

On April 18, 1962, United States Ambassador Arthur H. Dean presented to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." This plan, developed by the U. S. Disarmament Agency, has been officially characterized as "the most comprehensive blueprint for peace through multilateral international disarmament that the United States or any other country has ever undertaken."[2]

In fact, it is basically the same as the treaty which Adlai Stevenson submitted to the United Nations in September, 1961 — proposing to strip the United States of nuclear weapons, by turning them over to the United Nations. The 1962 proposal, however, presented a detailed, three-stage plan for national disarmament. Nations would re-

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duce their armaments by one-third each year for three years. Combat aircraft, ships, missiles, anti-missile systems, tanks, armored cars, and so on — all would be placed in a depot under supervision of an International Disarmament Organization. The IDO would have power to destroy them, order them converted for "peaceful" purposes, or order them turned over to a United Nations military force to strengthen the UN peace-keeping machinery.(2)

The Soviets rejected the American proposal.(2)

No agreement having been reached at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, President Kennedy ordered a resumption of American testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The series began on April 26, 1962. The testing was timid and halting, hobbled by politics and propaganda; and Kennedy permitted only a few tests in the atmosphere before again suspending them.(1,2)

To be continued and concluded next week.

* * * * *

Correction

Two serious errors were in this *Report* last week ("Are We Afraid To Defend Ourselves?"). Following a statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended production and deployment of 1200 MINUTEMAN ICBMs (Column 2, Page 18) is the sentence:

"McNamara ordered the force level of MINUTEMAN ICBMs reduced to 200."

The sentence should have read " . . . reduced *by* 200."

In Column 2 on Page 21, I said the planned force level of MINUTEMAN ICBMs had been reduced from 1200 to 200. I should have said, from 1200 to 1000.

Index

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FOOTNOTES

(1) *The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation*, by Stefan T. Possony, *Congressional Record*, March 21, 1963, pp. 4358-70 (daily)

WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Born in Missouri, reared in Texas, Dan Smoot went to SMU getting BA and MA degrees, 1938 and 1940. In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow, doing graduate work for a doctorate in American civilization. From 1942 to 1951, he was an FBI agent: three and a half years on communist investigations; two years on FBI headquarters staff; almost four years on general FBI cases in various places. He resigned from the FBI and, from 1951 to 1955, was commentator on national radio and television programs, giving *both* sides of controversial issues. In July, 1955, he started his present profit-supported, free-enterprise business: publishing *The Dan Smoot Report*, a weekly magazine available by subscription; and producing a weekly news-analysis radio and television broadcast, available for sponsorship by reputable business firms, as an advertising vehicle. The *Report* and broadcast give *one* side of important issues: the side that presents documented truth using the American Constitution as a yardstick. If you think Smoot's materials are effective against socialism and communism, you can help immensely — help get subscribers for the *Report*, commercial sponsors for the broadcast.

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(2) *Documents on Disarmament* 1945-1959, State Department Publication 7008, August, 1960, 1644 pp.; *Documents on Disarmament*, 1960, State Department Publication 7172, July, 1961, 419 pp.; *Documents on Disarmament*, 1961, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 5, August, 1962, 798 pp.; *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 19, November, 1963, 1363 pp.; *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 24, October, 1964, 740 pp.; *Documents on Disarmament*, 1964, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 27, October, 1965, 597 pp.

(3) *The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year* 1946, Department of State Publication 2735, February, 1947, 221 pp.

(4) *Review of the United Nations Charter, A Collection of Documents*, Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter of the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 7, 1954, pp. 436-42, 450-9, 474-80

(5) "Reds Grab Key Jobs In World Atom Agency," by Robert S. Allen, *The Tablet*, Brooklyn, N. Y., November 2, 1957, and *The Birmingham News*, November 3, 1957; "Expensive Bargain," by Seymour Freidin, *New York Post Magazine*, January 22, 1961, p. 7; editorial, *New York Daily News*, October 7, 1961, p. 9

(6) *The New York Times*, August 4, 1959, pp. 1, 3

(7) UPI story from Miami, *The Durham* (N. C.) *Morning Herald*, October 19, 1959

(8) *Congressional Record*, May 12, 1960, pp. 9412-23 (daily)

(9) *Proceedings of the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar*, prepared by the Stanford Research Institute, April, 1960

(10) Letter, U. S. Representative Walter Rogers (Dem., Tex.), February 2, 1963

(11) The American plan for total disarmament was published in September, 1961, by the Government Printing Office as State Department Publication 7277, entitled *Freedom From War: The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World*. Here are passages from the official text:

"The Nations of the world. . . . set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament . . .

"The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order; . . .

"As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened. . . .

"STAGE I. . . .

"An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. . . .

"Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels. . . . The reduction shall be accomplished . . . by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO. . . .

"Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

"Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted. . . .

"STAGE II. . . .

"Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out. . . .

"During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effecively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. . . . The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened. . . .

"STAGE III. . . .

"In Stage III, progressive controlled disarmament . . . would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force. . . .

"States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.

"The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

"The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. . . ."

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